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NOTES
CLA YTON V UAW: A TEMPORARY REPRIEVE
FROM THE EXHAUSTION OF
INTERNAL UNION APPEALS
IN DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION ACTIONS
A collective bargaining contract embodies an agreement on the terms
and conditions of employment reached by an employer and a union. ' Un-
til recently, the United States Supreme Court had spoken only to the issue
of exhaustion of the contractual remedies established by such an agree-
ment as a prerequisite to an employee's action seeking to enforce his con-
tractual rights under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA).2 The Court has held that an employee does not have standing to
sue his employer under section 301 unless he exhausts the available collec-
tive bargaining grievance procedures.3 However, it has excused such ex-
haustion when the plaintiff alleges and proves that the union breached its
duty of fair representation.4 Lower federal courts5 have also required
1. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BILL No. 1910 HANDBOOK
OF METHODS FOR SURVEYS AND STUDIES 2-3 (1976); see H.J. Heinz v. NLRB, 311 U'S. 514
(1941) (unfair labor practice for employer to refuse to reduce agreements to signed written
document).
2. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1974 § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Although the
specific subsection which is the subject of this article is § 301(a), this Note will follow the
common practice of referring to it as § 301. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 686-87 n. 122 (1973). See generally Bsharah v.
Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968); Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp.
206 (E.D. Pa. 1978). A cause of action is cognizable in state or federal court. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). Regardless of where the suit is brought, federal law applies.
Id There is a marked absence of state court cases in duty of fair representation suits.
3. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). Tobias,A Pleafor the Wrong-
fiuly Discharged EmployeeAbandoned by his Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 65 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Tobias I].
4. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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plaintiffs to exhaust the separate and independent internal Union appeals
procedures enumerated in union constitutions.6 There are two instances in
which a section 301 plaintiff may be required to exhaust internal union
appeals. The first instance is one in which the employee alleges that the
union breached its duty of fair representation" by failing to arbitrate his
grievance. Second, the issue of exhaustion of internal union appeals may
arise where the employee has exhausted the available grievance and arbi-
tration procedures but seeks to avoid their binding effect by alleging that
the union breached its duty of fair representation at arbitration.8
In Clayton v. UAW,9 the Supreme Court addressed the issue raised by
several lower courts of whether an employee who alleges that his union
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to process his grievance
through arbitration must exhaust internal union appeals procedures prior
to instituting a section 301 action. The Court held that an employee is not
required to exhaust intra-union remedies that cannot provide either the
complete relief he seeks or reactivate his grievance.
After working eight years for ITT Gilfillan, Clifford Clayton was fired
for violating a plant rule prohibiting certain defined acts of conduct. Clay-
ton followed the mandatory grievance procedure outlined in the collective
bargaining agreement between ITT and his union by asking his union rep-
resentative to file a grievance alleging that Clayton's dismissal was not for
just cause. The union pursued the grievance and made a timely request for
arbitration. The union later withdrew the request but did not inform Clay-
ton until after the time for requesting arbitration had expired. °
5. E.g., Winter v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Imel v. Zohn
Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1973); Bsharsh v. Eltra Corp.,
394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968).
6. For a general outline of internal appeals procedures in union constitutions, see
Craypo, The National Union Convention as an Internal Appeal Tribunal, 22 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 487, 489-90 (1969). See also Note, Public Review Boards.A Check on Union Disci-
plinary Powers, 11 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1959).
7. The duty of fair representation, initially declared by the Supreme Court in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944), prevents a labor union chosen as
an exclusive representative from representing its members in a discriminatory or arbitrary
manner, and requires that the union act in good faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177
(1967). See generally Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1978);
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957). Summer, The Individual
Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement." What Constitutes Fair Representation?
126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation."A Theoretical Struc-
ture, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 215 (1944).
8. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
9. 101 S. Ct. 2088 (1981).
10. Article IX of the collective bargaining agreement between Local 509 and ITT Gilfil-
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The union's constitution required Clayton to exhaust the internal union
appeals procedure before seeking redress in court."' Clayton did not file a
timely internal appeal of the local's decision not to seek arbitration. In-
stead, Clayton brought suit in federal court against his employer and his
union, the United Auto Workers (UAW),1 2 under section 301(a) of the
LMRA.13 He sought reinstatement of his job at ITT and, additionally,
monetary relief from both his employer and his union. 4 Clayton alleged
that his employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement by
discharging him without just cause, and that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation by refusing to arbitrate his grievance.' 5 Both
defendants relied on Clayton's failure to exhaust his internal union ap-
peals as an affirmative defense. The federal district court sustained this
defense and dismissed the suit. The court held that the union's internal
appeals procedure was adequate, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that ex-
haustion of those remedies would be futile. 6 Accordingly, the court held
that Clayton was required to exhaust the internal union appeals prior to
bringing his suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of Clayton's suit against the union, 7 holding that
Clayton's nonexhaustion of the internal appeals procedure was an ade-
quate defense with respect to his suit against the union for monetary re-
lief.' However, since the internal appeals procedure could not result in
Clayton's reinstatement or even in a reactivation of his grievance, the court
rejected the employer's assertion of Clayton's failure to exhaust as an af-
firmative defense. 9
lan provides that if the union wishes to request arbitration, it must do so within 15 working
days after the third step of the grievance procedure. Id at 2092 n. 1.
11. UAW Constitution, art. 33, § 5. The procedures incorporated into article IV of Local
509's bylaws are established in articles 32 & 33 of of the UAW Constitution. Clayton v.
UAW, 101 S. Ct. at 2092.
12. Ordinarily, to prevail in a § 301 action, the employee must establish that the union
breached its duty and that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement.
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976). For examples of cases
where the only defendant was the employee's union, see Foust v. IBEW, 442 U.S. 42 (1979);
Farmer v. Local 1064, Hotel Workers, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2166 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Seigle v.
Local 1336, UAW, 87 LR.R.M. (BNA) 3021 (W.D. Ky. 1973). Employees have also sued
only their employer. See, e.g., Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
13. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1976).
14. 101 S. Ct. 2088, 2096 (1981). See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) (union can
be sued alone for the portion of damages independently caused by it).
15. Id at 2092.
16. Clayton v. ITT Gilfillan, No. 76-730 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 1979).
17. Clayton v. ITT Gilfillan, 623 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 566-67.
19. Id at 569-70.
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The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. The Court held that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust
internal union appeals which cannot result in either an award of the com-
plete relief sought or in a reactivation of his grievance before suing his
employer and union.2" Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated
that in such cases exhaustion is a "useless gesture" and does not serve na-
tional labor policy,2" which favors private resolution of disputes arising
out of collective bargaining agreements.22
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. He maintained
that it was within the union's discretion to determine whether to pursue
arbitration.23 Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Stewart. He argued that the ma-
jority erred in holding that internal union remedies must be a complete
substitute for either the courts or the contract grievance procedure before
exhaustion of those remedies is required.24 Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the purpose of internal union remedies is "to facilitate or encourage
the private resolution of disputes, not to be a complete substitute for the
courts."25
This note will discuss the law of exhaustion as applied to internal union
appeals and duty of fair representation actions. It will examine the
Supreme Court's decision in Clayton and demonstrate the inappropriate-
ness of requiring a section 301 plaintiff to exhaust internal union appeals
prior to bringing a duty of fair representation suit. Finally, the note will
conclude with an analysis of the impact of Clayton on the future of collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
I. HISTORY OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT AND
INTERNAL UNION APPEALS
The exhaustion requirement was first applied to labor disputes with re-
20. 101 S. Ct. at 2093.
21. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
22. 101 S. Ct. at 2097.
23. Id at 2099. Justice Powell noted that the doctrine underlies the Court's decision in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). Justice Harlan's majority opinion in
Maddox noted that requiring the employee to afford his union the opportunity to act on his
behalf complements the union's prestige with employees and that permitting an employee to
avoid the grievance procedure would prevent the union and employer from establishing a
uniform and orderly method of settling employee grievances. Id at 653. For further discus-
sion of Maddox, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 2101.
25. Id
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spect to grievance procedures established by collective bargaining agree-
ments. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,26 the Supreme Court held that
an employee must exhaust the exclusive grievance and arbitration proce-
dures established in the collective bargaining agreement before he can sue
the employer for an alleged breach of that agreement. Not long after, in
Vaca v. Sopes,27 the Court applied this exhaustion requirement to section
301 actions involving the union's duty of fair representation.28 In Vaca, the
Court enumerated an exception to the general rule established in Republic
Steel29 and held that exhaustion of the remedies provided by a collective
bargaining agreement is not required where the employee can prove a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 0 The Court reasoned
that, without such an exception, the aggrieved employee would be left
without a remedy if his union exercised exclusive control over the contract
grievance procedure and refused to pursue his claim.
Republic Steel and Vaca involved remedies provided by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. They did not specifically address whether to require
exhaustion of remedies provided by the union's constitution. Nevertheless,
some lower courts extended Vaca and held that an employee need not
exhaust these internal union remedies. 31 A majority of federal courts, how-
ever, ruled that plaintiffs must exhaust these intra-union remedies prior to
bringing a duty of fair representation action.32 These courts employed dif-
26. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). In Maddox, a mine worker was laid off without severence pay
which he alleged was due under the collective bargaining agreement. Instead of following a
three-step grievance procedure provided for in the agreement, the employee waited three
years and then filed suit in an Alabama state court. The court ruled in his favor. The
Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the employee must "attempt" to follow the griev-
ance mechanism provided in the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 652.
27. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
28. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In Vaca, a discharged union member con-
tended that his dismissal violated the collective bargaining agreement and that his union had
arbitrarily decided not to process his grievance.
29. 386 U.S. at 184 (1967). Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53
(1965).
30. 386 U.S. at 186.
31. Eg., Keeler v. Great A & P Tea Co., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3050, 3052 (E.D. Mich.
1977). Several courts have emphasized the distinction between collective bargaining agree-
ment procedures and internal union remedies in an effort to counter this misconception. See,
e.g., Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 1978); Ratliff v. Ford Motor
Co., 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2699, 2702 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
32. Apparently, the First Circuit is the only court of appeals not to have recognized the
exhaustion requirement as it is applied to internal union appeals in duty of fair representa-
tion cases. The remaining 10 circuit courts have all either dismissed actions because the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust intra-union appeals or enumerated an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. Keene v. International Union of Operating Engr's Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375
(5th Cir. 1978); Winter v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Winterberger v. General Teamsters Auto Truck Drivers, 558 F.2d 923 (9th
1982]
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fering rationales to require exhaustion of intra-union appeals, and also de-
veloped vague standards for determining when the exhaustion prerequisite
can be waived.33
The first federal appellate case to consider whether an employee must
exhaust internal union remedies before bringing a section 301 action was
Bsharah v. Eltra Corp. 34 In Bsharah, the defendant employer had moved
its operations to a different plant and the plaintiff employee had requested
a transfer to the new location.35 When the request was denied, the em-
ployee filed suit against her employer and her union alleging that the
transfer denial breached her rights under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The district court dismissed the employee's action because she had
failed first to initiate an internal union appeal as required by the union's
constitution and bylaws. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed,36 but did not articulate its reasons for requiring
exhaustion.
Shortly after Bsharah, the Seventh Circuit developed the most persua-
sive rationale for the intra-union remedies exhaustion requirement in Or-
phan v. Furnco Construction Corp.3' The plaintiffs in Orphan filed
Cir. 1977); Bright v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1977); Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495
F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973); Caucuas v.
General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1971); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesman Local 2,
444 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1971); Brady v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1968); Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 377 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967). But see Chambers v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th
Cir. 1972).
33. Some courts have maintained that the adequacy of the intra-union appeals proce-
dure is determinative in deciding whether to require their exhaustion. See infra notes 37-46
and accompanying text. Other courts have excused exhaustion when it would be futile. See
infra notes 47-78 and accompanying text. The reasonableness of requiring exhaustion in
light of the facts and circumstances of the individual case has also been held to be the deci-
sive factor. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. A few courts have laid down a
blanket rule of exhaustion on the theory that such a rule allows for a union's self control
over its own affairs. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. Still other courts have dis-
missed suits against unions because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his internal union appeals
on the ground that the union constitution represents a binding contract between the union
member and his union. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
34. 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968).
35. Id
36. Id at 503.
37. 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972). See also, Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145,
149-50 (7th Cir. 1978); Willets v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1978); Verville v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 520 F.2d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1976));
Frederickson v. System Federation No. 114 of Ry. Employees Dep't, 436 F.2d 764, 768 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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grievances alleging that the defendant employer, a bricklaying and ma-
sonry contractor, violated the collective bargaining agreement in a number
of ways.3" When the union failed to process the grievances, the plaintiffs
filed suit against the union and the employer. The trial court dismissed the
action because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their intra-union reme-
dies. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' failure to
exhaust internal union remedies was not fatal to their action seeking dam-
ages against the employer. However, the court noted that a plaintiff must
prove that his union breached its duty of fair representation before the
merits of the breach of contract claim can be addressed. Therefore, the
court maintained that the employer can raise the plaintiffs failure to ex-
haust internal union remedies as a defense to a charge that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation. 9 The court held that exhaustion
should be excused only where internal union procedures are found to be
inadequate. Such a requirement is consistent with the national labor policy
favoring arbitration.' Unfortunately, the court failed to articulate a defi-
nition of "adequacy".
In Newgent v. Modine Manufacturing Co. , " the Seventh Circuit added a
further factor to the exhaustion of intra-union remedies analysis. In
Newgent, the plaintiff had been discharged for failing to report to work.42
He conceded that he had not exhausted the available internal union reme-
dies before filing suit against his employer and union. However, he main-
tained that he was unaware of the union's appeal procedures regarding
grievances and that he had relied on the advice of his union president.43
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that Newgent had
been terminated properly. The court maintained that there was no evi-
dence that the union's representation of Newgent was conducted in a dis-
criminatory manner or in bad faith. 44
The court of appeals affirmed and held that exhaustion of internal union
remedies is required if the available procedures are deemed adequate and
if, additionally, the union's constitution mandates exhaustion.45 Again, no
38. 466 F.2d at 797.
39. Id at 800-01.
40. See supra note 21.
41. 495 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974).
42. Id at 920-21.
43. Id at 922.
44. Id at 920.
45. Id at 927: "[W]here, as here, there is no question as to the adequacy and mandatory
nature of the intra-union remedies it is well settled that an exhaustion of the remedies is an
indispensable prerequisite to the institution of a civil action against a union." Some com-
mentators, noting that the plaintiff relied on the advice of the union president, assert that
19821
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meaningful standards were provided for determining the adequacy of in-
tra-union remedies.46
While some courts use the adequacy test, other courts have considered
the probable futility of internal union appeals as determinative of whether
to require exhaustion of intra-union remedies. 47 Imel v. Zohn Manufactur-
ing Co. 41 stands as an example. In Imel, the employees claimed their em-
ployer was underpaying them in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. 49 The employees alleged that they had attempted to file a
grievance but that the union and the employer refused to process it.50 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union because the
employees had failed to exhaust the administrative appeals procedure pro-
vided by the union constitution.5 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed,52 reasoning that unless there was a clear and
affirmative showing of futility, exhaustion would promote harmony in the
field of labor-management relations. 3 The court held that because the em-
Newgent is an example of a rigid application of the adequacy theory. See, e.g., Tobias,
Indipidual Employee Suitsfor Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair
Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514, 531 n.48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tobias II]. The
court stated that the plaintiff had an implied duty "to become aware of the nature and
availability of union remedies." Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 928 (7th Cir.
1974). It noted that the union constitution was "freely available from the U.S. Secretary of
Labor upon request." Id at 928 n. 18.
46. See Comment, The Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Sec-
tion 301 Actions Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHI. KENT L. REV. 259, 268
(1979).
47. E.g., Keppard v. International Harvester Co., 581 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing
Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974)); Keene v. Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engr's Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1978); Bright v. Taylor,
554 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1977); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 960 (1974); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2, 444 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1971). Some
courts have used both factors and spoken of the adequacy of the available union remedies
along with the probable futility of exhausting them. Eg., Baldini v. Local No. 1095, 581
F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1978); Buzzard v. Local Lodge 1040, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973);
Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967).
There is a distinction between the futility standard and the adequacy test. In general, courts
applying the adequacy test have looked to the procedures for appeal set out in the union
constitution. However, if the union's policy is not to pursue employees grievances, the plain-
tiff might escape the exhaustion requirement, even though the appeals procedure provided
by the union's constitution is adequate. See Negri v. Service Employees Local 87, 97
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3100 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
48. 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1973).
49. Id at 182.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id at 184.
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1982] Internal Union Appeals
ployees had not made such a showing, they were required to exhaust the
available union appeals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
looked to the possible futility of exhaustion in Winter v. Local 639, Interna-
tionalBrotherhood of Teamsters. 54 In Winter, the plaintiff had filed a griev-
ance which alleged that his employer should award seniority on a
company-wide, rather than plant-wide basis. The union declined to pro-
cess Winter's grievance. He later filed suit in federal court, seeking, in part,
injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment for the
union because Winter had failed to exhaust the internal union appeals pro-
cedure." The court of appeals affirmed, but indicated that if exhaustion of
internal union remedies would be futile, then it would not be a prerequi-
site to a section 301 action.56 The court stated that exhaustion is futile in
two situations: 57 where the union constitution does not empower the ap-
peals body to award the relief sought, and where hostility of the local
union officials would deny a fair hearing to the employee. Since there was
no clear showing of union hostility, 8 and Winter could have obtained his
desired relief through the internal union appeals procedure, 9 the court
concluded that he was required to exhaust his internal union remedies
before suing the union.60
In deciding to require exhaustion, the Winter court relied in part on sec-
tion 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA).6' The LMRDA provides safeguards to assure the democratic
conduct of internal union affairs.62 Title I enumerates a "Bill of Rights"
54. 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
55. Id at 148.
56. Id at 149.
57. Id
58. Id. at 150.
59. Id at 149.
60. Id at 150.
61. 569 F.2d at 148. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1976) provides in relevant part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court or . . . before any administrative agency, irrespective of
whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants ....
Provided that any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organiza-
tion, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organiza-
tions or any officer thereof ....
See generally Beaird & Player, Exhaustion of Intra- Union Remedies and Access to Public
Tribunals Under the Landrum-Grin Act, 26 ALA. L. REv. 519 (1974); Boyle, The Labor Bill
of Rights and the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies--A Marriage of Convenience, 16 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 590 (1965); O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue Under the
Landrum-Grfin Act, 14 CATH. U.L. REv. 215 (1965).
62. See LMRDA § 2 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
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for union members, covering such matters as union meetings and discipli-
nary proceedings.63 Section 101(a)(4) guarantees to union members the
right to sue and the right to participate in administrative proceedings, but
also contains a proviso which permits courts to require plaintiffs to exhaust
internal union appeals for a maximum of four months before filing suit
under Title I.' The court in Winter noted that the exhaustion requirement
is based on the policy of "staying the hand of judicial interference with the
internal affairs of a labor organization until it has at least some opportu-
nity to resolve disputes concerning its own internal affairs."' 65 Reasoning
that the union constitution established a contract between the employee
and his union, the court held that the union could raise the employee's
failure to exhaust intra-union procedures as a defense.66 It is arguable,
however, whether a duty of fair representation claim properly can be
termed an internal union affair,67 because the claim normally concerns the
discipline of an employee as well as the union's refusal to pursue the em-
ployee's grievance. In addition, while section 101(a)(4) protects only union
members' rights, the union owes a duty of fair representation to all mem-
bers of the appropriate bargaining unit, including non-union employees.68
Therefore, the section 101(a)(4) proviso can be applied to fair representa-
tion cases only by analogy.69
While some commentators maintain that Winter articulated an exhaus-
tion standard,7" in reality, it did little more than detail two more circum-
stances in which courts may consider exhaustion futile.7 ' Other courts
63. See LMRDA § 101(a)(I)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(1)-(5) (1976).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976).
65. 569 F.2d at 148 n.6.
66. Id at 150. The court, however, granted summary judgment to the employer on the
ground that he did not breach the collective bargaining agreement. For further discussion of
the contract theory, see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
67. Just two months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit argued that employment relations issues and not questions of internal union
affairs were raised by duty of fair representation cases. Chambers v. Local 639, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Cham-
bers, see infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
68. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 202-03 (1944).
69. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Comment, supra note 46, at 270-71.
71. Compare Goelowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977) (ex-
haustion excused where union indicates fixed position not to process employee's grievance)
with Sciacca v. Wine Salesmen's Union, Local 18, 65 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11, 780 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (conclusory allegations of anticipated union refusal to process insufficient to establish
futility). See also Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(employee who was regularly misinformed by union about the status of his grievance not
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have determined exhaustion to be futile where the union did not have the
power to revive the contractual grievance procedure, 72 where the delay in-
volved in pursuing internal union appeals was lengthy enough to prejudice
the plaintiffs case,73 and where the union's action in refusing to process
the employee's grievance was found to be willful, wanton, arbitrary and
capricious.74
Only two months after deciding Winter, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied a different test for deter-
mining the exhaustion issue in Chambers v. Local 639, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. 75 The plaintiffs in Chambers had been laid off
and sought to "bump" workers with less seniority at the employer's second
plant.76 The employees argued that the collective bargaining agreement
with their union required merger of the seniority lists at the two plants.
While the union initially supported the employees' grievances, it later op-
posed company-wide seniority at a grievance hearing.77 Subsequently, the
plaintiffs filed suit in federal court. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the union because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust
their internal union remedies. 78 The court of appeals vacated the judg-
ment, holding that in light of the facts and circumstances, it would be un-
reasonable to require exhaustion.79 Thus, instead of examining the
exhaustion issue in terms of futility, ° the court adopted a standard of
reasonableness first developed by the Supreme Court in an analogous case,
NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers."l
In Marine Workers, the Court addressed the intra-union exhaustion re-
quirement in the context of an internal disciplinary action allegedly viola-
tive of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the LMRA. 2 In that case, the plaintiff filed a
required to exhaust internal union remedies). But cf. Perry v. Chrysler Corp., 101 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2681 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (exhaustion not excused where employee had not relied on
union misinformation).
72. Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. Dorn v. Meyers Parking Sys. Local 596, F. Supp. 779, 785 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Cf.
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (employee already had fol-
lowed intra-union appeals procedures for 27 months).
74. Zamora v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
75. 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
76. Id at 377.
77. Id at 378.
78. Id at 379, 383.
79. Id at 388. The court noted that the union had reached a decision adverse to the
plaintiffs which the employer was willing to implement and that there was little, if any,
chance that the union would change its position during the appeals process. Id at 387.
80. Id at 386.
81. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
82. Section 8(b)(l)(A) states that it is an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or
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charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that a union of-
ficer had violated the union constitution.83 Subsequently, he was expelled
from the union because he had not exhausted the available internal union
remedies prior to filing the charge. The plaintiff filed a second charge with
the Board, claiming that his expulsion was unlawful. The Board found that
the expulsion violated the LMRA and issued a remedial order.8 4 However,
the court of appeals refused to enforce the order and set it aside, relying on
the exhaustion proviso of section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA.s5 On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and enforced the Board's or-
der, holding that the union could not expel the plaintiff for not exhausting
the internal union procedures before he filed a charge with the Board.8"
The rationale for the Court's holding in Marine Workers is not readily
apparent. At one point in the majority opinion, Justice Douglas stated that
the discretionary exhaustion proviso of section 101(a)(4) does not author-
ize unions to police their members more firmly.87 Rather, the proviso
grants courts discretion to require exhaustion of internal union remedies.
This language suggests that a union may never discipline a member be-
cause he failed to exhaust intra-union appeals before filing suit. Further-
more, Justice Douglas indicated that the internal union appeals procedure
invoked in Marine Workers was inapplicable because the plaintiffs com-
plaint did not concern an internal union matter, but, instead, raised public
policy issues that were covered by the LMRA.88 He reasoned that Con-
gress intended the exhaustion proviso of the LMRDA to be interpreted in
light of the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular case.89 He
concluded that it was unreasonable to require the plaintiff to exhaust his
internal union appeals where the complaint or grievance touched a part of
the public domain covered by the LMRA.9° However, Justice Douglas also
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(l)(A) (1976). Section 7 guarantees to employees the right to freedom of choice in
labor activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Exhaustion is rarely required in cases involving the
imposition of internal union discipline. One commentator has noted that in such cases courts
have developed so many exceptions that the rule of exhaustion is effectively repudiated in
internal union discipline actions. Summers, The Law of Union Discipine What the Courts
Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 207 (1960).
83. 391 U.S. 418, at 419-20.
84. Id at 421.
85. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702 (3d
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
86. 391 U.S. 418.
87. Id at 426.
88. Id at 425.
89. Id at 427-28, (quoting 105 CONo. REC. 17,899 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)).
90. Marine Workers does not provide a clear answer as to what issues touch a part of
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suggested that, under certain circumstances, a union may discipline a
member for failure to exhaust.
Some commentators have urged that the facts and circumstances lan-
guage in Marine Workers should also control duty of fair representation
actions.9 ' This reasonableness standard has been used by some courts. 9
2
However, Chambers v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
demonstrates the limited utility of the standard. The Chambers court
looked to the merits of the allegation that the union breached its duty of
fair representation,93 to the type of internal union review procedures avail-
able,94 and to the fact that employment relations, and not internal union
affairs, were involved. 95 Those factors arose under the particular facts and
circumstances of Chambers and are not significant in all duty of fair repre-
sentation cases. The surrounding facts and circumstances test articulated in
Marine Workers and applied in Chambers provides no more than a gen-
eral guideline as to when courts should require exhaustion.96
While many courts have adopted vague standards to be used in section
301 exhaustion cases, others have laid down a near blanket rule requiring
exhaustion. These courts have maintained that exhaustion of internal
union remedies encourages and supports a union's self-control over its
own affairs. Consequently, with little consideration of the exhaustion issue,
these courts have dismissed suits against unions where the plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his internal union remedies.97 Most often, courts have
the public domain. Justice Douglas's opinion merely states that a court or agency "might
consider whether a particular procedure was reasonable." 391 U.S. at 428.
The difficulties encountered with Douglas's opinion in Marine Workers are illustrated
well by Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 105 L.R.R.M. 219 (3d Cir. 1980). In Pawlak, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the distinction between internal
union matters and those which touch a part of the public domain is not relevant to suits
brought under the LMRDA because that act was designed specifically to regulate internal
union affairs. See also Operating Eng'rs Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Ross v. IBEW, 544 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. Eg., Note, Exhaustion of Intra- Union Procedures in Duty of Fair Representation
Cases, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 520, 530 (1979); Tobias I, supra note 3, at 72.
92. See Bise v. Local 1969, IBEW, 618 F.2d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
980 (1979) (internal union discipline action); Day v. Local 36, UAW, 466 F.2d 83, 96 (6th
Cir. 1972).
93. 578 F.2d at 383.
94. Id at 383-84.
95. Id at 387.
96. See Comment, supra note 46, at 263.
97. E.g. Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1048 (1968) (union should be allowed to resolve disputes concerning its own legitimate
affairs). Accord Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1978) (court
should avoid interfering until union has at least had some opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning its own internal affairs); Hazen v. Western Union Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 766, 769
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implied the existence of a blanket rule of exhaustion in dicta. Courts which
have held that an employee is not required to exhaust his internal union
appeals before suing his employer often have relied on the theory that the
union constitution represents a binding contract only between the em-
ployee and his union. In dicta, these courts imply that exhaustion always is
required before an employee can sue his union.
Many courts that have dismissed suits because the plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his internal union remedies have neglected to distinguish between
the action against the union and the action against the codefendant em-
ployer.98 A number of courts using the adequacy standard in deciding the
exhaustion issue also have allowed the employer to use the plaintiffs fail-
ure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. 99 In fact, at least one court has
held that the employer can use the defense whenever it is available to the
union."°° The vast majority of courts, however, have determined that the
exhaustion defense is not available to the employer because he is not a
party to the employee/union contract, i.e., the union constitution. '0'
In Orphan,1"2 the Seventh Circuit became the first court explicitly °3 to
apply contract analysis to the question of whether an employer may rely
on an exhaustion defense."°4 The court noted that the case involved the
plaintiff's failure to exhaust internal union remedies and not remedies out-
(6th Cir. 1975) (purpose of NLRA "thwarted" by an employee's ability to circumvent proce-
dures over which union has control).
98. See Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1978); Foy v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 377 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967); McGovern v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 447 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Pa.), a f'd, 588 F.2d 821
(1978).
99. E.g., Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Shep-
herd v. Chrysler Corp., 433 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
100. Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
101. Eg., Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1978); Battle v.
Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978); Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F. Supp.
1258 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aft'd, 575 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1978).
102. 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
103. The Eighth Circuit, in Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972),
had used a similar approach. In that case, the plaintiffs sued their employer for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement and their union for failing adequately to process their griev-
ances. The plaintiffs, two female employees, alleged that Rath Packing had failed to make
certain jobs available to women and, alternatively, had failed to assign them to jobs to which
they were entitled, based on their seniority and qualifications. Id at 314. The appellate court
held that the company could not use the employee's failure to exhaust as a defense because
"[t]he question of exhaustion of internal union procedures is the Union's concern, not the
Company's." Id at 315. The contract analysis approach is implied from this statement.
104. It is ironic that prior to enactment of statutory protections for the American worker,
the contract analysis was utilized in labor cases to afford members rights vis-A-vis their un-
ions. See generally Summers, supra note 82, at 184. Today, the contract analysis is used in
order to restrict such rights.
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lined by the collective bargaining agreement to which the employer was a
party.' 0
5
The court then noted that the employer was not a party to the union
constitution. He had not bargained for adherence to union procedures and
had no control over compliance with them. 06 Thus, the court held that the
employer could not rely on the plaintiffs failure to adhere to provisions of
the union constitution as an affirmative defense.
While the contract approach to the exhaustion issue appears logical on
its face, at least one commentator has argued that the union constitution's
review procedures can only be considered a binding contract between a
union and its members if traditional rules of contract construction are ig-
nored."°7 The terms of a union constitution are often vague 0 8 and fall
short of the certainty normally required of a contract.'0 9 The disparity in
the bargaining strength of the parties to a union constitution also under-
mines the contract theory as it has been applied to union membership. l o
The union member has no real choice of "terms" in the intra-union ex-
haustion procedures and thus is restricted in his freedom of contract."'
The above review of federal court of appeals' decisions demonstrates
that the courts have developed various reasons to support the requirement
of exhaustion of internal union appeals prior to the filing of a duty of fair
representation action. Not surprisingly, the conflicting and often vague cir-
cuit court opinions have led to cries for a final determination of the is-
105. 466 F.2d at 799-800.
106. Id at. 800.
107. Note, supra note 91, at 532-34. See also Fox & Sonethal, Section 301 and Exhaustion
of Intra- Union Appeals. A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1015 (1980).
108. For a detailed treatment of the vagueness problems in disciplinary provisions of
union constitutions, see Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 483, 492-508 (1950). For an example of the Supreme Court's recognition of this aspect
of union constitutions, see International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401
U.S. 233 (1971).
109. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-13 (2d ed. 1977).
110. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1457-58 (1963).
!1I. Contracts of adhesion are analyzed differently than mutually bargained contracts in
determining whether a contract was created and how it should be interpreted. See Patterson,
The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1919). For a general discus-
sion of adhesion contracts, see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
It is unclear whether joining a union which requires the exhaustion of internal appeals
before filing suit constitutes a knowing and voluntary waiver of the member's right to legal
redress. Basic contract theory requires that a waiver involve the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-34 (2d ed.
1977).
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sue." 2 The Supreme Court's response came in Clayton v. AW.11 3
II. CL4YTON: A TEMPORARY REPRIEVE
In Clayton v. UAW, 4 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of exhaus-
tion of remedies provided in the union constitution as a prerequisite to
bringing a duty of fair representation suit. Although it ruled that the peti-
tioner was not required to exhaust his intra-union appeals, the Court failed
to resolve conclusively the difficulties presented by this issue.
The majority began its examination of the exhaustion question by not-
ing the distinction between grievance settlement procedures provided in
collective bargaining agreements and internal union appeals procedures
set forth in union constitutions. The Court reasoned that the contractual
procedures which an employee is required to exhaust under Republic
Steel" '5 are significantly different from those procedures created exclu-
sively by a union constitution." 
6
The Court then proceeded to examine the two principle arguments of
Clayton's employer and union. The employer and union first argued that
Clayton should be required to exhaust the internal union appeals proce-
dures to facilitate the union's ability to regulate its internal affairs. Sec-
ondly, they argued that requiring exhaustion would be consistent with the
national labor policy favoring the private resolution of disputes arising out
of collective bargaining contracts. The Court dismissed the first contention.
Relying on language in Marine Workers, the Court determined that the
policy of restraining judicial interference with internal union affairs was
not broad and was inapplicable to this case because Clayton's suit raised
issues beyond internal union interests." 7
The Court then addressed the respondents' argument that exhaustion
promotes the private resolution of disputes arising out of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Court found that exhaustion does not always serve
this purpose, and declined to establish a universal exhaustion requirement.
Instead, the Supreme Court held that courts have discretion in determining
whether to require exhaustion. The Court declined to require employees to
112. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 46, at 259-60; Fox & Sonenthal, supra note 107, at
989-1035.
113. 101 S. Ct. 2088 (1981).
114. Id
115. 379 U.S. 650 (1963). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
116. 101 S. Ct. at 2094.
117. Id at 2094-95, (quoting Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, at 426 n.8). The Court cited
this language for the proposition that "the policy of deferring judicial consideration of inter-
nal union matters does not extend to issues 'in the public domain and beyond the internal
affairs of union."' 101 S. Ct. at 2095.
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undertake lengthly and inadequate internal union procedures," 8 perhaps
concerned that requiring exhaustion in all cases would deter employees
with meritorious claims from pursuing their grievances. Citing language in
Marine Workers, the Court established a tripartite test to determine when
exhaustion is not required: first, where union officials are so hostile to the
employee that he could not receive a fair hearing; second, where the union
remedies cannot provide the relief sought; or third, where the employee's
opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing would be unreasonably delayed by
exhaustion of internal union procedures." 9 The Court did not consider the
first factor because the fairness of the union procedures was not chal-
lenged.1 20 Similarly, the third factor was never discussed.'
2
'
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, focused its attention
on the second factor and concluded that the internal union remedies avail-
able to Clayton were inadequate because they could not provide him with
the complete relief he sought.' 22 Although the union could have awarded
at least some monetary relief, it was powerless to reinstate Clayton in his
former job. Moreover, the union could not reconsider Clayton's grievance
because the time period for reactivating grievances under the collective
bargaining agreement had expired. 123
The Court stated that where internal union appeals cannot result in ei-
ther complete relief or reactivation of an employee's grievance, the na-
tional labor policy of encouraging the private resolution of contractual
labor disputes would not be served by requiring exhaustion. The majority
contended that in such cases exhaustion would be useless, delaying judicial
consideration but not eliminating the need for it.
124
Finally, the majority turned to the UAW's contention that even if ex-
haustion was not required before Clayton could bring his section 301 ac-
tion against his employer, it should have been a prerequisite to his suit
against the Union.' 25 The Court rejected this argument and ruled that the
exhaustion question should be addressed as if only one suit were in-
118. Id at 2095.
119. Id
120. Id at 2095-96.
121. Id at 2097 n.19.
122. Id at 2096-98.
123. Id at 2096. The majority maintained that where a collective bargaining agreement
allowed for reinstatement of withdrawn grievances, the relief available would "presumably
be adequate." Id at 2097 n.18.
124. Id at 2097.
125. Id at 2098-99. Interestingly, the union's claim was not based on a contractual the-
ory but rather on the fact that the union's internal appeals procedure could provide all the
relief Clayton sought in his action against the UAW.
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volved.' 26 The Court held that where a section 301 suit is brought against
both the union and the employer and neither complete relief nor reinstate-
ment of the employee's grievance is possible, staying the action against the
employer pending a decision of the union's appeals board violates national
labor policy which effectively requires exhaustion when the remedies are
inadequate. Furthermore, if the action against the employer is not stayed,
a requirement that the plaintiff exhaust his internal union appeals before
filing suit against the union would result in two separate section 301 court
actions, 27 thereby unnecessarily burdening the courts.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion argued that the union had not made
a final determination whether to pursue arbitration and, therefore, Clayton
could not claim a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. In ad-
dition, Justice Powell interpreted Republic Steel to require an employee to
exhaust all procedures intended to aid the union in deciding whether to go
forward with a grievance before filing a court action, even if revival of the
grievance appeared to be barred by time limitations in a collective bar-
gaining agreement.' 28
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist maintained that an employee should
always be required to exhaust internal union remedies, for a period of at
least four months, before bringing a section 301 action against either his
union or employer.' 29 He asserted that the second factor of the majority's
three prong test was improperly framed, arguing that neither Marine
Workers nor any other Supreme Court decision supported the majority's
contention that the adequacy of internal union appeals procedures should
be examined in terms of their ability to provide the relief sought. More-
over, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the national labor policy favoring
the private resolution of labor disputes is promoted by the exhaustion of
all intra-union appeals procedures, even those which could not provide
reinstatement or grievance reactivation. He argued that exhaustion of in-
ternal union appeals could avoid litigation in two ways. First, through the
intra-union appeals procedures, the union might convince the employee
that it had determined correctly not to pursue his grievance. In the event
that the union decided that it had breached its duty of fair representation,
the employer would be faced with the immediate prospect of the employee
126. Id at 2099. For a similar analysis and result, see Chambers v. Local 659, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2098.
128. Id at 2099. The Union's decision to withdraw its request for arbitration was, in
effect, final due to the subsequent expiration of the period in which such a request could be
made.
129. Id at 2100-02. Cf 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(4) (1976) (proviso requires exhaustion for four
months). See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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filing suit and thus would probably reactivate the grievance voluntarily.
Second, Justice Rehnquist maintained that even if litigation were com-
menced following the exhaustion of the intra-union appeals, the proce-
dures might benefit courts by narrowing the factual and legal issues
involved. 1
30
Justice Rehnquist further stated that it was reasonable to allow a union
the right to correct its own mistakes, at least for a short period of time. 31
Relying on the discretionary exhaustion provision of section 101(a)(4) of
the LMRDA, 32 Justice Rehnquist inferred that Congress had determined
that the benefits provided by exhaustion outweighed the price paid in lim-
iting access to the courts for a short time.'
33
The requirement that a plaintiff exhaust the available internal union ap-
peals procedures prior to bringing a duty of fair representation action has
questionable merit. Clayton can be most strongly criticized for its disregard
of proposals to abolish totally the exhaustion of internal union appeals
requirement in duty of fair representation actions.' 34 It has been urged
that even where a union constitution and the applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement allow for reactivation of an employee's grievance by a
union tribunal, the problems undoubtedly encountered in applying the ex-
haustion doctrine outweigh the possible benefits. 13 As the National Labor
Relations Board has recognized, it is doubtful that the union always will
provide full and fair representation of the employee's reinstated grievance
after having determined not to prosecute it. 136 Furthermore, it has been
suggested by at least one commentator that higher union tribunals may be
unavoidably biased in favor of local union officials 13' and reluctant to re-
verse their decisions. 3 An employer may also argue that his liability
should be restricted because the union's initial decision not to pursue the
grievance contributed to the employee's injury. 139 If such an argument is
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2100-01.
131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
132. Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1976). See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
133. 101 S. Ct. at 2101-02.
134. See Tobias II, supra note 45; Fox & Sonethal, supra note 107, at 989.
135. Fox & Sonethal, supra note 107, at 1032-35.
136. Cf. NLRB v. Local 396, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th
Cir. 1975) (enforcement of NLRB order finding that union had breached its duty of fair
representation in failing to process employees' grievances and remanding case to determine
if an award of attorneys fees against the union was necessary to vindicate the employees
rights).
137. See Tobias I, supra note 3, at 71.
138. See Tobias II, supra note 45, at 532 n.52. Tobias, however, offers no evidence to
support this claim.
139. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967). The monetary award which a plaintiff in a
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raised, the employee may well have to bring suit against the union to re-
cover damages resulting from the added difficulty and expense of collect-
ing from the employer as a result of its refusal to handle the employee's
grievance." 4 Finally, in at least some cases, even if the employee ulti-
mately wins a favorable award he may not be able to obtain complete
relief without judicial aid. For example, a collective bargaining agreement
may allow for reactivation of withdrawn grievances but explicitly relieve
the employer of financial liability accruing from the time the grievance is
dropped to the time it is later reactivated."'4 Therefore, although the Clay-
ton Court properly refused to hold that exhaustion of internal union ap-
peals procedures should always be required, it failed to recognize the
invalidity of contentions that exhaustion promotes the conservation of ju-
dicial resources.1
42
The Court also failed to delineate the boundaries of the third factor in
its three prong test for determining when to require exhaustion of intra-
union appeals procedures. 4 3 It gave no indication of what would consti-
tute an unreasonable delay. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist
implied that a delay greater than four months would be unreasonable. If
this is the case, then exhaustion will be required in few, if any, cases since
intra-union appeals procedures can be pursued for years before they are
exhausted completely.' 44It is also possible that the Court will follow lower
federal courts in requiring plaintiffs to exhaust their internal union appeals
duty of fair representation suit seeks is usually based chiefly on loss of wages resulting from
a discharge. When the union determines not to process the employee's grievance, the em-
ployee is normally without work for a longer period than if the union does grieve, and
accordingly, damages increase. It is notable, however, that the employer, not the union,
initially causes the employee's loss of wages.
140. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970).
141. See, e.g., Manica v. Chrysler Corp., 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2679 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
The collective bargaining agreement involved in Manica provided that if a grievance were
withdrawn, all financial liabilities of the employer were to be cancelled, and if the grievance
were reinstated within three months, the employer's financial liability would accrue from the
date of reinstatement. Id at 2681.
142. It is said that the exhaustion requirement permits courts to defer to others who
possess expertise in labor relations. Rusicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th
Cir. 1975). Exhaustion of intra-union appeals, as Justice Rehnquist urged in his dissent in
Clayton, also may eliminate the need for subsequent litigation or facilitate subsequent judi-
cial disposition by affording partial relief. Internal union remedies may also allow an ag-
grieved employee quickly to resolve a dispute without the delay inherent in the judicial
process. Id.
143. 101 S. Ct. at 2095. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
144. Fox & Sonethal, supra note 107, at 977. This is particularly the case where appeals
must be taken to a union convention. Most union constitutions require conventions to be
held no more than once every two years. Id at 997 nn.34 & 35.
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for a maximum of four months. 4 Finally, where the alleged breach of the
union's duty of fair representation concerns the effectiveness of the union's
actions at the arbitration stage, it is doubtful that the Court will ever re-
quire exhaustion of internal union procedures since the applicable statute
of limitations in these cases is normally short and, thereby, would deny the
plaintiff a forum.' 46 Clayton does not indicate which, if any, view the
Supreme Court will adopt.
Still, Clayton provides the section 301 plaintiff with at least a temporary
respite from the inappropriate intra-union exhaustion requirement which
had developed previously in the lower courts. Employees no longer will be
required to engage in time-consuming and ineffective union appeals, pro-
vided that they sue both the union and the employer, or just the employer,
and the relief sought is not available through internal union procedures.
Although the Court's reasoning in Clayton may be flawed, the dissent is
more susceptible to criticism. Perhaps the most serious defect is Justice
Rehnquist's contention that the Court improperly relied upon Marine
Workers.'47 It is true that Marine Workers did not define adequacy in
terms of the ability of internal union procedures to provide an employee
with the complete relief he seeks. It is also true that the Clayton majority
erred in not making clear the rationale behind its test for determining the
adequacy of intra-union remedies. The problem with Marine Workers,
however, is that it fails to define adequacy sufficiently. 148 The Clayton ma-
jority expands and gives meaning to the earlier language of the Court.
Moreover, the Court's decision in Clayton coincides with a number of
lower federal court decisions which suggest that an inability to provide the
complete relief sought by a section 301 plaintiff renders the union proce-
dures inadequate.
1 49
145. See, e.g., Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1978); Winter
v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 148 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 250 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (claim
under the Railway Labor Act).
146. In United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 101 S. Ct. 1559 (1981), the Supreme Court
recently ruled that a 90 day state statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration
awards, and not the state's six year statute of limitations governing breach of contract issues,
applied to the plaintiff's suit which alleged that his union had breached its duty of fair
representation during arbitration. Because state statutes of limitations for actions to vacate
arbitration awards typically provide such a short period, id at 1564 n.5, courts will rarely, if
ever, have the opportunity to require exhaustion in these cases. See also Scott v. Chrysler
Corp., 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3086 (E.D. Mich. 1981). But cf. Flowers v. Local 2602, United
Steelworkers of America, No. 80-7020 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 1982) (court refused to apply Mitchell
analysis in action against union).
147. 101 S. Ct. at 2101 (citing NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)).
148. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980);
Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich 1978); Emmanuel v. Omaha
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist, like others before him,15° erred in maintain-
ing that section 101 (a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act is applicable to duty of fair representation cases. The first
difficulty with this argument is that Title I of the LMRDA concerns inter-
nal union affairs, such as disciplinary proceedings, and can be applied to
duty of fair representation cases only by analogy. Also, while section
101(a)(4) concerns the rights of union members to file suit, the duty of fair
representation is owed to all members of the bargaining unit, even if they
are not union members.' 5' For this reason, and because other LMRDA
titles have separate exhaustion provisions, it has been urged that the ex-
haustion proviso of section 101(a)(4) was intended to apply only to suits
involving Title I union membership rights.5 2 Moreover, it is clear that the
subsection was intended to assure, not restrict, the member's right to sue
his union. 153
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion contains an escape provision which
undoubtedly will be used frequently. In a footnote, 5 4 the Clayton majority
indicated that when a collective bargaining agreement permits the reacti-
vation of grievances, the union's internal appeal procedures "would pre-
sumably be adequate."' 55 Therefore, it can be expected that when current
collective bargaining agreements are renegotiated, the use of reactivation
provisions, currently found in few agreements, 56 will become more
widespread.' 57
Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F. Supp. 204 (D. Neb. 1976); Lucas v. Philco-Ford Co., 380 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151. See Gould, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court 1980-81 Term, 107 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 342, 356.
152. Fox & Sonethal, supra note 107, at 1020.
153. The basic intent and purpose of the provision was to insure the right of a
union member to resort to the courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures
without interference or frustration of that right by a labor organization. On the
other hand, it was not and is not, the purpose of the law ... to invalidate the
considerable body of State and Federal court decisions of many years standing
which require, or do not require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court
intervention depending upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of
the facts and circumstances of a particular case. So long as the union member is not
prevented by his union from resorting to the courts, the intent and purpose of the
'right to sue' provision is fulfilled ....
105 CONG. REC. 17,899 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). See also Detroy v. American
Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
154. 101 S. Ct. at 2096 n.18.
155. Id For reasons outlined above, this supposition may not be proper. See supra notes
135-46 and accompanying text.
156. 101 S. Ct. at 2096 n.18.
157. It should be noted that even where a collective bargaining agreement provides for
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III. CONCLUSION
In Clayton v. UAW, the Supreme Court ruled that when internal union
appeals cannot either award plaintiff the complete relief he seeks or reacti-
vate his grievance, the aggrieved employee is not required to exhaust those
appeals prior to filing a section 301 suit. The immediate effect of Clayton is
to remove the exhaustion requirement from all but a small number of
cases. This is a welcome, albeit incomplete, change. Clayton does little
more than delay a thorough determination of whether internal union rem-
edies must be exhausted in all duty of fair representation cases. It does not
abolish the exhaustion requirement entirely. It does not provide clear
guidelines as to when to require exhaustion nor does it articulate an unam-
biguous rationale for such a requirement. It can only be hoped that future
decisions of the Court will recognize the cost of requiring the section 301
plaintiff to exhaust internal union appeal procedures and the concurrent
benefits of allowing immediate judicial review of an aggrieved employee's
claim. In light of the Clayton holding, this seems an unlikely prospect. Per-
haps the only long-term hope for those advocating the abolishment of the
exhaustion requirement is to be found in the third requirement of the
Court's three prong test. The question remains, however, as to how much
of a delay resulting from exhaustion the Court will deem unreasonable in
reviewing a claim that a union breached its duty of fair representation by
failing to process a grievance through arbitration.
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reactivation, Clayton probably excuses the failure to exhaust intra-union remedies where the
alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation arose from the union's handling of
the arbitration. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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